

# Differential Games for Compositional Handling of Competing Control Tasks



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# Abstract

We present a novel Divide and Conquer (D&C) design methodology for separating the handling of competing objective in controllers. By guarantying a Nash Equilibrium in a virtual game, we synthesize a controller that establishes a balance between the objectives and allows the control engineer a disciplined method for tuning the parameters along the design cycle.

# Continuous Linear-Time-Invariant (LTI) System

A continuous dynamical system S, with state and input vectors  $\mathbf{x}(t) \in \mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$  and  $\mathbf{u}(t) \in \mathcal{U} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ , defined for all  $t \in \mathcal{I} = [t_0, T_f] \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ , is **LTI** if it is governed by the following first order differential equation, which is called its **state space representation**:

 $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + B\mathbf{u}(t)$ 

with a given initial condition  $\mathbf{x}(t_0) \coloneqq \mathbf{x_0} \in \mathcal{X}$  and possibly a desired state (in case of signal tracking)  $\mathbf{x}(T_f) \coloneqq \mathbf{x_T} \in \mathcal{X}$  where:

•  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$  is a time-invariant matrix representing the **unforced dynamics** of S;



•  $B \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$  is the time-invariant **input coefficients** matrix of S.

 ${\cal S}$  can be illustrated by the following block diagram:



### **Continuous Virtually Decomposed LTI System**

Given a continuous LTI system S, and  $N \in \mathbb{N}$ , an equivalent **virtually decomposed LTI** system, denoted  $S_N$  is defined as an LTI system that adheres the following model:

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + \sum_{i=1}^{N} B_i \mathbf{v}_i(t)$$

while satisfying:

$$B\mathbf{u}(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} B_i \mathbf{v}_i(t)$$

and where:

•  $(\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{i}}(t))_{i=1}^{N}$  are **virtual input vectors**, with each being a vector of some length  $m_{i} \in \mathbb{N}$  such that  $\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{i}}(t) \in \mathcal{V}_{i} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{m_{i}}$ . We denote  $\mathcal{V} \coloneqq \mathbf{X}_{i=1}^{N} \mathcal{V}_{i} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{\sum_{i=1}^{N} m_{i}}$ ;

•  $(B_i)_{i=1}^N$  are virtual input coefficients matrices where each  $B_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m_i}$ .

 $\mathcal{S}_N$  can be illustrated by the following block diagram:



with the following linearized mode:



We decompose the system using the following virtual inputs:

$$v_x(t) \coloneqq \frac{m_p L^2 + 4I}{m_c m_p L^2 + 4I(m_c + m_p)} F(t) + \frac{2m_p L}{m_c m_p L^2 + 4I(m_c + m_p)} M(t)$$
$$v_\theta(t) \coloneqq \frac{2m_p L}{m_c m_p L^2 + 4I(m_c + m_p)} F(t) + \frac{4(m_c + m_p)}{m_c m_p L^2 + 4I(m_c + m_p)} M(t).$$

into the following decomposed system  $\mathcal{S}_{IP_{x, heta}}$ :

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = A\mathbf{x}(t) + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0\\0\\1\\0\end{bmatrix}}_{B_r} v_x(t) + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0\\0\\0\\1\end{bmatrix}}_{B_{\theta}} v_{\theta}(t)$$

Signal tracking simulation results:

 $\mathbf{x_0} \coloneqq \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ \theta_0 \\ \dot{x}_0 \\ \dot{\theta}_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 20 \ [m] \\ \pi/3 \ [rad] \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} ; \mathbf{x_T} \coloneqq \begin{bmatrix} -3 \ [m] \\ \pi/4 \ [rad] \\ 10 \ [m/s] \\ 5 \ [rad/s] \end{bmatrix}$ 



#### **Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium**

Given a decomposed system  $S_N$ , its **virtual quadratic cost functions** are a series of functions  $(J_i)_{i=1}^N$ , where each  $J_i: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{I} \to \mathbb{R}^+$  assumes the following form:

$$J_i\left(\mathbf{x}(t), (\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{j}}(t))_{j=1}^N, t\right) \coloneqq \int_t^{T_f} \left[\mathbf{x}^T(\tau)Q_i \mathbf{x}(\tau) + \sum_{j=1}^N \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{j}}^T(\tau)R_{ij} \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{j}}(\tau)\right] \mathrm{d}\tau + \mathbf{x}^T(T_f)Q_{f_i} \mathbf{x}(T_f),$$

where:

•  $(Q_i)_{i=1}^N$  are virtual state weights, each  $Q_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$  is a positive semi-definite matrix;

•  $((R_{ij})_{j=1}^N)_{i=1}^N$  are virtual input weights, each  $R_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^{m_j \times m_j}$  is a positive definite matrix. With that, a series of virtual policies  $(\mathbf{v}_j^*(t))_{j=1}^N$  is said to constitute an **Open-Loop Nash** Equilibrium if for all  $1 \le i \le N$ :

# $J_i\left(\mathbf{x}(t), (\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{j}}^*(t))_{j=1}^N, t\right) \leq J_i\left(\mathbf{x}(t), (\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{j}}^*(t))_{\substack{j=1\\j\neq i}}^N, \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{i}}(t), t\right)$

for any other admissable virtual input  $\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{i}}(t) \in \mathcal{V}_i$  and for all  $t \in \mathcal{I}$ . In words, a series of virtual inputs  $(\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{i}}^*(t))_{i=1}^N$  constitutes an Open-Loop Nash equilibrium if it is not possible to decrease any

Convergence times  $T_c$  (time to achieve the condition:  $\|\mathbf{x}(t) - \mathbf{x}_T\| < 10^{-5}$ ) of  $S_{IP}$  and  $S_{IP_{x,\theta}}$  for different  $m_c, m_p, L$  values:



## Comparing State Space Variables with $(m_c, m_p, L) \equiv (200, 15, 1)$



cost function  $J_i(t)$  only by changing its corresponding virtual input  $\mathbf{v}_i^*(t)$  to some other input  $\mathbf{v}_i(t)$ .

#### Nash Equilibrium Solution

The Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium problem is solved by closed-loop feedback policies  $(\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{i}}^*(t))_{i=1}^N$  of the following form:

$$\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{i}}^*(t) \coloneqq -R_{ii}^{-1}B_i^T P_i^*(t)\mathbf{x}(t),$$

where the matrices  $(P_i^*(t))_{j=1}^N$  are a solution to the following set of coupled matrix differential Riccati equations:

$$\begin{split} \dot{P}_i(t) + A_{cl}^T(t)P_i(t) + P_i(t)A_{cl}(t) + Q_i + \sum_{j=1}^N P_j(t)B_jR_{jj}^{-1}R_{ij}R_{jj}^{-1}B_j^TP_j(t) = 0, \\ \text{with } A_{cl}(t) \coloneqq A - \sum_{j=1}^N B_jR_{jj}^{-1}B_j^TP_j(t), \text{ along with appropriate terminal conditions of the form:} \\ (P_i(T_f))_{i=1}^N \equiv (Q_{f_i})_{i=1}^N \end{split}$$

# A Proof-of-Concept Python Library

A tool that supports the proposed methodology is openly accessible at <a href="https://github.com/krichelj/PyDiffGame">https://github.com/krichelj/PyDiffGame</a>. The tool uses a novel approach for solving Algebraic Riccati Equations for computing equilibria of differential games.